Predicting the future is a tricky business. At the end of the cold war not even the most imaginative analyst dared to suggest Danish land forces would deploy to high intensity operations in Iraq and later Afghanistan within a foreseeable future. So instead of trying to predict future missions for the Danish Army, this paper will attempt to define the context in which the future development of the Danish Army will take place. In order to understand the current situation of the Danish Army this paper will start out with a study of the development of Danish defense policy and the consequences for the development of the Danish Army over the last two decades. This study will establish settings for the future development of the Danish Army and provide a basis for discussing the possibilities of developing a relevant land force for the future. The experience from the army's deployments in international operations has shown that the army deploys combined arms battalions -so called battalion battle groups. The army's operational structure, however, has so far not sufficiently reflected this ... there is consensus that the army's operational structure should focus on the battalion battle group .... In addition to the ability to deploy battalion battle groups the Army must maintain a capacity to form a unit of brigade size after a longer period of preparation. Combat support units and support units must be modular and fit into the battalion battle group framework. The army maintains a fire support capacity for international operations. With the latest defense agreement, the Danish Army must continue to be prepared to participate in the full spectrum of operations, and be ready to deploy -and 13 sustain -a battalion battle group of up to 800 soldiers to missions all over the world, and at the same time maintain a capacity to form a unit of brigade size after a longer period of preparation. However, the aim and purpose of being able to form a brigade size unit is not clear. The use of "form" and not "deploy" could indicate that the brigade size capacity does not relate to international deployments but merely national operations.
Another weakness of the current mission statement is the lack of a definition of what kind of enemy the army must be able to fight -and defeat. Even though the term "full spectrum of operations" would seem to include high intensity combat operations it does not say anything about the capacity to fight an armored opponent. 
The Strategic Choices
It seems clear that the Danish Army will have to adjust in order to be able to sustain a battalion battle group of 800 soldiers. It also seems obvious that the Danish Army, sooner or later, will have to transform into a lighter force, as a consequence of the inability to pay for the replacement of some of the existing heavy equipment. So, the real strategic choice for the Danish Army is probably not whether it should transform into a lighter land force, but when and how to transform.
In the likely scenario of no Danish Army deployments in a foreseeable future, there would seem to be good arguments for delaying this transformation. First of all, the current organization of the Danish Army enables the deployment of a battalion battle group of up to 800 soldiers to the full spectrum of operations, where a lighter force may not be able to participate in operations against an armored opponent. So by maintaining the present heavy capacities for as long as possible, the Danish Army will remain a more flexible tool for the Danish government in the likely future of no larger land forces deployed. At the same time, the inability of the current organization to sustain three infantry companies will have to be overcome by reorganizing the army after the decision to deploy a battalion battle group to an international operation has been made.
Secondly, the current organization provides the Danish Army with a national framework for training in a combined arms environment with a combination of heavy and light capacities. Transforming the army to a light force will require support fromand cooperation with -partner nations in order to conduct combined arms training.
Thirdly, transforming into a lighter force will require investment in new vehicles.
The case of leasing MRAP vehicles in Afghanistan shows how difficult it is to predict what type of vehicles will be required five or ten years from now. As a consequence the vehicle type bought today may be obsolete when the next deployment comes. So, by delaying the transformation, the risk of buying the wrong equipment can at least be reduced.
Last, but maybe not least, delaying the likely transformation to a lighter land force will at the same time preserve the most flexible land force for as long as possible. Even though the official Danish policy is based on ruling out any threats towards Danish territory within the next decade, not even experts can predict the future. And by maintaining the full spectrum capable army for as long as possible, the Army will be best prepared for any eventuality in the future. This may well be "stewardship of the army", but since it is not in conflict with the political directions for the Danish Army, it is worth considering.
Conclusion
Over time, the Danish Army will likely be forced to give up the heavy capacities of the current organization and transform into a lighter force, as a simple consequence of the lack of resources for equipment in the foreseeable future. In order to be a relevant land force of the future, the Army will at the same time have to increase the ability to sustain more infantry companies, in order to deliver "feet on the ground" which will be at the expense of some at the current capacities of tank units, engineer units, and not least logistic units.
In order to be the most flexible land force for the immediate future, including the capacity to fight an armored land force, it seems relevant to maintain the current heavy capacities of the Danish Army until the situation demands otherwise. An upcoming deployment of a battalion battle group of 800 soldiers -and not least the sustainment of this -or the end of the life cycle of the current heavy capacities, will force the Danish
Army to reorganize to a lighter force. At the same time it is obvious, that future acquisition of vehicles and equipment will have to be aimed at the future "light army". An example of this is the coming fire support system for the Army that must fit into the operational requirements of the light battalion battle group.
